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INFINITE FORCING AND THE GENERIC MULTIVERSE
GIORGIO VENTURI
Abstract. In this article we present a technique for selecting models
of set theory that are complete in a model-theoretic sense. Specifically,
we will apply Robinson infinite forcing to the collections of models of
ZFC obtained by Cohen forcing. This technique will be used to suggest
a unified perspective on generic absoluteness principles.
Introduction
Soon after the invention of forcing, in 1963, the abundance of inde-
pendence results started to undermine the hope for a unified picture of the
universe of all sets. An exemplar reaction is the formalist perspective taken
by Cohen himself in the more philosophical interpretation of his celebrated
result on the independence of the Continuum Hypothesis.
So, let me say that I will ascribe to Skolem a view, not ex-
plicitly stated by him, that there is a reality to mathematics,
but axioms cannot describe it. Indeed one goes further and
says that there is no reason to think that any axiom system
can adequately describe it.1
But forcing, by itself, does not disprove a realist perspective on truth in
set theory. On the contrary, the deep understanding and refinement of the
method helped the search for forcing invariant theories [18], [17], with the
goal to isolate the right axiomatic extensions of ZFC.
The question whether forcing suggests to abandon or allows to strengthen
our search for a unified picture does not have a clear answer. Moreover,
even on the side of a realist interpretation of mathematical reality, the de-
bate on competing extensions of ZFC shows that choosing the right criteria
to overcome independence is a complex task, where not only mathematical
considerations need to be taken into account [1], [14], [16], [19].
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We propose here to accept a generic perspective on mathematical truth,
without nevertheless embracing position a` la Balaguer-Hamkins [8], [3],
akin to a kind of formalism. Indeed, the starting point of this work con-
sists in accepting independence as an essential limitation of our axiomatic
method. This means that, in order to complete ZFC, we should not only
try to extend the axioms of set theroy, but we also need semantic consid-
erations for the selection of the right models. But on which ground should
we choose?
Tools for the semantic completion of mathematical theories have been
largely studied in model theory. We propose here to apply a technique
that has proven to be successful in other fields: Robinson infinite forcing.
This method originates from the study of model complete theories and
generalizes the notion of algebraically closed field to the algebraic study
of other classes of structures. Differently from Cohen’s forcing, Robinson’s
infinite forcing does not build new models but it selects the generic ones
out of a given class of structures.
In this paper we investigate the possibility to apply Robinson infinite
forcing to the so-called generic multiverse: the collection of ZFC mod-
els obtained by Cohen forcing. This will allow us to use algebraic con-
siderations for the selection of the relevant generic models of set theory.
Interestingly, these generic models will show a high degree of genericity,
offering a unified picture of generic absoluteness principles like Bounded
Forcing Axioms, Resurrection Axioms, and Maximality Principles. If any,
the importance of this perspective is given by the unified picture it offers.
The paper is structured as follows: in §1.1 we briefly present the gen-
eral theory of Robinson infinite forcing, that we apply, in §1.2, to the
generic multiverse of ZFC. Finally, in §1.3, we offer two concrete examples
of generic models of set theory. We conclude, in §2, with plans for future
work.
1. Robinson infinite forcing of Cohen generic multiverse
The basic structure we study in this paper is the collection of generic
extensions of a countable transitive model M ; c.t.m. henceforth.
Definition 1.1. Given a c.t.m. M of ZFC and a class of forcings Γ,
defined by a first order formula ϕΓ in the language of set theory, we let M
Γ
M
be the collection of all generic extensions of M by elements of ΓM , i.e., the
extension of the relativization of ϕΓ to M . Moreover for N,N
1 P MΓ
M
we
set N 1 ďMΓ
M
N , whenever N 1 is a generic extension of N by means of a
notion of forcing P P ΓN .
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We call MΓ
M
the Γ set-generic multiverse of M . Notice that if a class of
posets Γ contains the trivial forcing and is closed under two steps iterations,
we can consider a multiverse MΓ
M
as a partially ordered set.
Notation 1.2. We indicate the Cohen forcing for adding one Cohen real
as Addpω, 1q, while with Addpω, ωq we refer to its isomorphic copy which
adds ω-many Cohen reals. We regard Addpω, 1q as the partial order of
finite binary sequences in 2ăω and each Cohen real c as an element of the
Cantor space 2ω.
We can now define the two main mutliverses we will study in §1.3.
Definition 1.3. By MC
M
we indicate the Γ set-generic multiverse of M ,
where Γ consists of the Cohen forcing Addpω, 1q and the trivial forcing.
Moreover, by Mκ
M
we indicate the multiverse consisting of all generic ex-
tensions of M by forcing of cardinality ď κM .
We call MC
M
the Cohen generic multiverse ofM , while Mκ
M
the κ generic
multiverse of M .
1.1. Robinson’s forcing. The central motivation underlying Robinson’s
forcing2 is not set theory, but algebra. In particular, Robinson was inter-
ested in finding analogs of algebraically closed fields within other classes
of structures. To this aim Robinson introduced minimal conditions which
must be satisfied in order for a structure to have “algebraically closed”
extensions.
Robinson defined two distinct model-theoretic notions of forcing, namely,
infinite and finite forcing. The latter resembles more closely Cohen’s forcing
and it will not be discussed in this work. On the other hand, infinite forcing
characterizes a concept that is closely related to the notion of existential
completeness—i.e., when Σ1-formulas are absolute between a structure and
its extensions—and of model-companionship, which is defined as follows.
Definition 1.4. Given two first order theories T and T ˚, expressed in the
same language, we say that T ˚ is the model companion of T iff (a) T and
T ˚ are mutually consistent (i.e., every model of T is embeddable in a model
of T ˚ and vice versa) and (b) T ˚ is model complete (i.e., every embedding
between two models of T ˚ is elementary).
In order to apply Robinson infinite forcing to the Cohen generic multi-
verse, we recall few definitions and facts.
Definition 1.5. Infinite forcing is a relation between a structure M and
a formula ϕ, with (a possibly empty set of) parameters in M . In symbols
2See [11] and [12] for a general presentation.
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M (i ϕ. In words M i-forces ϕ. It can be recursively characterized as
follows.
(1) if ϕ is atomic, then M (i ϕ if and only if M |ù ϕ,
(2) M (i ϕ^ ψ if and only if M (i ϕ and M (i ψ,
(3) M (i ϕ_ ψ if and only if M (i ϕ or M |ùi ψ,
(4) M (i Dxϕpxq if and only if M (i ϕpaq, for some element a PM ,
(5) M (i  ϕ if and only if, for any extension N of M , N does not
i-force ϕ.
As usual we consider other connectives like @ and Ñ as abbreviations.
Remark 1.6. In Definition 1.5 we are implicitly assuming the existence of
an appropriate interpretation, in M , of the language in which a formula ϕ
is expressed. For the sake of simplicity we will continue to avoid this level
of details, since it is not relevant for the arguments of this paper.
Definition 1.7. We say that a structure M is infinitely generic whenever,
for any formula ϕ, it is the case that M (i ϕ or M (i  ϕ.
Infinitely generic structures are those in which forcability and satisfia-
bility coincide.
Theorem 1.8. ([11], Theorem 3.3) If a structure M is infinitely generic,
then M |ù ϕ iff M (i ϕ, for every formula ϕ.
Under specific conditions, infinitely generic structures always exist.
Theorem 1.9. ([11], Proposition 3.2) If a class of structures Σ is inductive
(i.e. the union of structures in Σ results in a structure in Σ), then any
structure in Σ can be extended to an infinitely generic structure in Σ.
1.2. Modified Robinson’s forcing. We can now state the relevant prop-
erty that we need to impose on the multiverse in order to apply Robinson
infinite forcing. We need to select a Γ such that MΓ
M
is σ-closed.
Even though the elements of MΓ
M
are not closed under arbitrary unions,
σ-closeness will provide enough directness for Robinson infinite forcing con-
struction to go through. Towards this end we can define the relevant modi-
fication of Robinson infinite forcing; the only difference is that we consider
generic extensions instead of Ď-extensions.
Definition 1.10. The relation N infinitely forces ϕ in the M-multiverse,
denoted N (M ϕ, between a structure N P M
Γ
M
and a sentence ϕ of the
language of set theory, with (a possibly empty set of) parameters in N , is
defined as follows:
(1) if ϕ is atomic, then N (M ϕ if and only if N |ù ϕ,
(2) N (M ϕ^ ψ if and only if N (M ϕ and N (M ψ,
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(3) N (M ϕ_ ψ if and only if N (M ϕ or N |ùM ψ,
(4) N (M Dxϕpxq if and only if N (M ϕpaq, for some element a P N ,
(5) N (M  ϕ if and only if there is no Q such that Q ďMΓ
M
N and
Q (M ϕ.
As in Definition 1.5, other connectives like @ and Ñ are treated as ab-
breviations.
Remark 1.11. For notational convenience we will drop the subscript M
from the (M -relation, since we are not interested here in specific multi-
verses. Therefore we will refer to Definition 1.10 as the infinite multiverse
forcing and not as the infinite M-multiverse forcing. However it should be
kept in mind that the definition of the infinite multiverse forcing may not
be absolute3.
The following facts are easy consequences of the definition of the infin-
itely generic forcing and show similarities of this notion both with Cohen
forcing and with the satisfaction relation.
Fact 1.12. If ϕ is a sentence of the language of set theory, with parameters
in a model N , then N cannot infinitely generic force both ϕ and  ϕ. 
Fact 1.13. If ϕ is a sentence of the language of set theory, with parameters
in a model N , such that N ( ϕ, and Q is such that Q ďMΓ
M
N , then
Q ( ϕ. 
Our main interest in Robinson forcing is given by the possibility to de-
fine structures that are generic in a model theoretic sense. The following
definition is meant to capture a notion that is a mixture of Cohen’s forcing
and Robinson’s infinite forcing.
Definition 1.14. An element N of MΓ
M
will be called infinitely generic in
the multiverse if for each sentence ϕ of the language of set theory, with
parameters in N , either N ( ϕ or N (  ϕ.
Structures that are infinitely generic in the multiverse not only exist,
but are dense in the partial order induced by the relation of generic ex-
tendability.
Theorem 1.15. Every model in MΓ
M
is a substructure of a model that is
infinitely generic in the multiverse.
Proof. Let N be an element of MΓ
M
and let tϕn : n P ωu be an enumeration
of all the sentences in the language of set theory, with parameters in N .
Set N0 “ N and define inductively the following chain in M
Γ
M
. Let Nm
3On the lack of absoluteness of Robinson’s infinite forcing see [15].
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be defined, if Nm ( ϕm or Nm (  ϕm, then let Nm`1 “ Nm. Otherwise,
since Nm *  ϕm, there is an an N
1 such that N 1 ďMΓ
M
Nm and N
1 ( ϕm.
Then, let Nm`1 “ N
1.
Now, let N1 be a grater lower bound of tNm : m P ωu. By σ-closeness,
N1 is still a member of MΓ
M
. Moreover, if ϕ is a formula with parameters
in N , either N1 ( ϕ or N1 (  ϕ. In order to make an extension of N
fully generic we continue this construction and we generate a sequence of
models tNm : m P ωu such that
(1) for all m P ω, we have Nm`1 ďMΓ
M
Nm, and
(2) if ϕ is a a sentence, with parameters in a model Nm, then either
Nm`1 ( ϕ or Nm`1 (  ϕ.
Then let Nω be a grater lower bound of tNm : m P ωu. By construction
Nω ďMΓ
M
N and it is infinitely generic in the multiverse. 
It is possible to prove an analog of Theorem 1.8 in this new setting.
Theorem 1.16. ([11], Theorem 3.3, essentially) A model N P MΓ
M
is
infinitely generic in the multiverse if and only if, for each sentence ϕ with
parameters in N , the following holds: N ( ϕ if and only if N |ù ϕ. 
While Cohen forcing produces models that can differ substantially be-
tween each others, Robinson’s forcing produces models that display a very
stable theory.
Proposition 1.17. If N is a structure that is infinitely generic in the
multiverse and N 1 is a second structure that is infinitely generic in the
multiverse and such that N 1 ďMΓ
M
N , then N ă N 1: i.e., N is an elemen-
tary substructure of N 1.
Proof. Let ϕ be a sentence with parameters in N . If N |ù ϕ, then N ( ϕ.
So N 1 ( ϕ and therefore N 1 |ù ϕ. On the other hand if N 1 |ù ϕ, then
N 1 ( ϕ. Now, since N (  ϕ would contradict that N 1 ( ϕ, then, due to
the genericity of N , we have that N ( ϕ. This is enough since we get that
N |ù ϕ. 
Proposition 1.17 is the key ingredient to show the high level of absolute-
ness displayed by the structures that are infinitely generic in the multiverse.
In order to make the above statement more precise we need a couple of
definitions that are adaptations of analogous notions from model theory.
Definition 1.18. Given N and N 1 such that N 1 ďMΓ
M
N , N is said to be
existentially complete in N 1, if every Σ1-sentence with parameters in N
and true in N 1 is also true in N . Moreover, we say that N is existentially
complete in MΓ
M
if N is existentially complete in N 1 for every N 1 such that
N 1 ďMΓ
M
N .
INFINITE FORCING AND THE GENERIC MULTIVERSE 7
We are now ready to state an important property of the structures that
are infinitely generic in the multiverse.
Proposition 1.19. Every structure that is infinitely generic in the multi-
verse is existentially complete in MΓ
M
.
Proof. Let N be a structure that is infinitely generic in the multiverse and
let ϕ be a Σ1-sentence with parameters in N and true in some N
1 such that
N 1 ďMΓ
M
N . Then, by Theorem 1.15, there is a model N2 that is infinitely
generic in the multiverse and such that N2 ďMΓ
M
N 1. Since ϕ is Σ1 and
holds in N 1, then ϕ holds in N2, too. Now, applying Proposition 1.17, we
obtain that ϕ holds in N . 
As the rest of the section will show, infinitely generic structures in MΓ
M
display a very strong level of generic absoluteness with respect to generic
extensions by posets in Γ. In [2], Bounded Forcing Axioms have been
characterized in terms of generic absoluteness, showing that BFApκ,Γq is
equivalent to say that, for all P P Γ, Hκ` ăΣ1 H
V P
κ`
.
Corollary 1.20. Let N be an infinitely generic structures in MΓ
M
, then
for all κ, BFApκ,Γq holds in N . 
Being existentially complete in MΓ
M
is enough for having absoluteness
with respect to all Π2-sentences.
Proposition 1.21. If N is existentially complete in N 1 and ϕ is a Π2-
sentence with parameters in N which holds in N 1, then ϕ holds in N .
Proof. Let ϕ “ @x1, . . . , xnψpx1, . . . , xnq, with ψ being Σ1. Let a1, . . . an
be arbitrary but fixed elements of N . Then, since N 1 ďMΓ
M
N , we have
that N Ď N 1 and therefore that ϕ can be seen as having parameters in
N 1 also. Since ϕ holds in N 1, we have that ψpa1, . . . , anq also holds in
N 1. Being N existentially complete in N 1 and ψ being Σ1, we get that
N |ù ψpa1, . . . , anq. By arbitrariness of the choice of a1, . . . an we have that
N |ù @x1, . . . , xnψpx1, . . . , xnq must be the case. Hence ϕ holds in N . 
Corollary 1.22. If N is existentially complete in MΓ
M
and ϕ is a Π2-
sentence with parameters in N , that holds in N 1 for some N 1 such that
N 1 ďMΓ
M
N , then ϕ holds in N . 
Definition 1.23. Given N and N 1 such that N 1 ďMΓ
M
N , N is said to be
Π2-complete in N
1, if every Π2-sentence with parameters in N and true in
N 1 is also true in N . Moreover, we say that N is Π2-complete in M
Γ
M
if
N is Π2-complete in N
1 for every N 1 such that N 1 ďMΓ
M
N .
Proposition 1.24. Every structure that is infinitely generic in the multi-
verse is Π2-complete in M
Γ
M
. 
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Besides these closure properties, infinitely generic structures capture an
even more fundamental aspect of generic absoluteness: the possibility that
a formula is persistent across the generic multiverse.
Theorem 1.25. Let ϕ be a formula with parameters in N , with N infinitely
generic in the multiverse. If ϕ holds in some N 1 Ě N and @N2 Ě N 1pN2 |ù
ϕq, then N |ù ϕ.
Proof. We know that N 1 |ù ϕ. Now extend N 1 to an N2 that is infinitely
generic in the multiverse. By hypothesis N2 |ù ϕ, but now, by Proposition
1.17, we get that N |ù ϕ. 
Notice that, in modal terms, Theorem 1.25 implies that an infinitely
generic structure in the multiverse verifies the modal principle ♦lϕÑ ϕ,
where lϕ is defined as “ϕ holds in all generic extensions by forcing in Γ”.
Interestingly enough this principle has been studied both in the context
of the modal logic of forcing and in the context of generic absoluteness
principles. In the former case has been named Maximality Principle [7],
while in the latter case represents a weak form of Resurrection Axiom
[10]. Indeed, ♦lϕÑ ϕ is modally equivalent to ϕÑ l♦ϕ, which in turns
expresses the fact that if a formula ϕ is valid in a modelM , then, whatever
is the generic extension of M we consider, it is possible to further extend
it to a new model where ϕ holds.
Hamkins’ Resurrection Axiom is actually stronger, being in the form of
an equivalence.
Definition 1.26. (Hamkins, [10]) The Resurrection Axiom RA(Γ) asserts
that for every forcing Q P Γ, there is a Q-name 9R with 1Q , 9R P Γ and
such that H2ℵ0 ă H
V Q˚
9R
2ℵ0
.
Using Theorem 1.25 we get the following corollary.
Corollary 1.27. Let N be an infinitely generic structure in MΓ
M
, then
if HN
2ℵ0
|ù ϕ, then, for every forcing Q P Γ, there is a Q-name 9R with
1Q , 9R P Γ such that H
NQ˚
9R
2ℵ0
|ù ϕ. 
Notice that Theorem 1.25 allows for a stronger version of the above
corollary; one that avoids the restriction of the parameters to H2ℵ0 . In
other words, with the terminology of [7], we have that an infinitely generic
structure in MΓ
M
models the boldface version of the Maximality Principle
restricted to forcings in Γ.
The question, then, is whether there are multiverses such that the prop-
erties of Γ allow to show that MΓ
M
is σ-closed. Next section will provide
such examples.
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1.3. Examples. We now turn our attention to the forcing MC
M
. Contrary
to the fact that there are sequences of length ω of Cohen forcing extensions
that are non-amalgamable,4 the following theorem shows that nonetheless
it is possible to find lower bounds for countable sequences of elements of
MC
M
.
The following theorem was proved in a series of conversations with Joel
David Hamkins, in 2011, at the Young Set Theory Workshop in Bonn and
continued at the summer school on set theory and second order logic, held
in London during the same year.5
Theorem 1.28. (Hamkins, V.) Let M be a countable transitive model of
ZFC and let xcn : n P ωy be a tower of (finitely) mutually M-generic Cohen
reals
M ĎMrc0s ĎMrc0src1s Ď . . .
Then there is a M-generic Cohen real d such that cn PMrds. As a conse-
quence Mrc0src1s . . . rcns ĎMrds. Furthermore, d is Mrc0, . . . cns-generic.
Proof. The idea of the construction consists of making finitely many changes
to each real cn, resulting in a real dn, in such a way that the resulting com-
bined real d isM-generic for the forcing Addpω, ωq. To do this we construct
d as a binary function d : ω ˆ ω Ñ 2, where the nth slice will correspond
to a real dn : ω Ñ 2.
To this aim, fix an enumeration xDn : n P ωy of all open dense sets
of Addpω, ωq in M . We construct d in stages, by defining a sequences
xdn : n P ωy of reals and another auxiliary sequence xpn : n P ωy of finite
conditions in Addpω, ωq that will guarantee the genericity of d. Suppose
we are at stage n and we have completely specified dk, for k ă n, and
we are also committed to a finite condition pn´1 P Addpω, ωq such that
pn´1æn Ď d0 ˆ . . . ˆ dn´1. We now want to get into the dense set Dn.
By inductive hypothesis d0 ˆ . . . ˆ dn´1 is an M-generic real, since each
dk is a finite modification of the corresponding ck which are mutually M-
generic. Now, choose a Cohen real e that is Mrd0 ˆ . . . ˆ dn´1s-generic
for Addpω, ωq and such that pn´1 Ď d0 ˆ . . . ˆ dn´1 ˆ e; this is possible
since compatibility with pn´1 amounts in finite modifications that preserve
genericity. Notice that d0 ˆ . . . ˆ dn´1 ˆ e is M-generic for Addpω, ωq.
Consequently there is a finite p Ď d0 ˆ . . . ˆ dn´1 ˆ e in Dn. Since both
p and pn´1 are included in d0 ˆ . . . ˆ dn´1 ˆ e we have that p Y pn´1 is a
condition that, since Dn is open, is in Dn. Call this union pn. We then
finitely modify cn to a new condition dn, so to be compatible with pn; hence
pnæpn` 1q Ď d0 ˆ . . .ˆ dn. Therefore, defining d “
Ś
nPω dn, we will have
4See Observation 33 of [6].
5For completeness we report the proof that already appeared in [9].
10 GIORGIO VENTURI
that d will eventually contain all conditions pn and so will beM-generic for
Addpω, ωq. Indeed every pn is finite and at each step of our construction
we build d in order to include more and more initial coordinates of a given
pn. Moreover, cn PMrds, since each cn is a finite modification of dn. Hence
Mrc0src1s . . . rcns ĎMrds. 
Since the product of countably many copies of Addpω, 1q is isomorphic
to Addpω, 1q, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 1.29. The forcing MC
M
is σ-closed. Therefore, infinitely generic
structures in the multiverse MC
M
exist. 
However, when considering larger classes of posets, like σ-closed, proper
or semiproper posets, it is easy to see that the countability of the modelM
represents a serious obstacle for the construction of infinite generic models
in MΓ
M
. This is because in countably many steps we can reach the hight of
the model and thus we risk to collapse everything to countable or to violate
the powerset axiom. Next theorem shows that to avoid these phenomena
it is sufficient to put a bound on the posets allowed.
Theorem 1.30. ([6], Theorem 34) Suppose that M is a countable model
of ZFC, and
MrG0s ĎMrG1s Ď . . . ĎMrGns Ď . . .
is an increasing sequence of forcing extensions of W , with Gn Ď Qn P M
being M-generic. If the cardinalites of the Qn’s in M are bounded in M ,
then there is a set-forcing extension MrGs with MrGns Ď MrGs, for all
n ă ω. 
Then we have the following schema of theorems.
Theorem 1.31. The forcing Mκ
M
is σ-closed. Therefore, infinitely generic
structures in the multiverse Mκ
M
exist.
Proof. It is sufficient to apply Theorem 1.30 to any ω-chain in Mκ
M
, noting
that the proof of Theorem 34 in [6] shows that when the Gn’s are mutually
generic, it is possible to build a generic extension witnessing the closure of
the chain by a filter G that is also generic with respect to each Gn. 
Notice that Theorem 1.31 is optimal, because of the following result.
Theorem 1.32. ([9] Theorem 12) Suppose that M is a countable model of
ZFC, and
MrG0s ĎMrG1s Ď . . . ĎMrGns Ď . . .
is an increasing sequence of forcing extensions of W , with Gn Ď Qn P M
being M-generic. The following are equivalent:
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(1) The chain is bounded above by a forcing extension MrHs, by some
forcing notion Q PM and an M-generic filter H Ď Q.
(2) Letting κn be the smallest size, inM , of the Boolean completion of a
forcing notions Pn, for which there is an M-generic filter Hn Ď Pn
such that MrGns “MrHns, we have that suptκn : n P ωu P M .
If the cardinalites of the Qn’s in M are bounded in M , then there is a
set-forcing extension MrGs with MrGns ĎMrGs, for all n ă ω. 
1.4. Open problems. Since MApκq is equivalent to MApκq restricted to
postes of cardinality ď κ, Theorem 1.31 suggests the following interesting
question:
Question 1 : Letting Γκpc.c.c.q be the class of c.c.c. posets
of cardinality ď κ, is M
Γκpc.c.c.q
M
σ-closed?
More in general, defining BFApΓκq to be the weakening of BFApκ,Γq
where a poset in Γ is assumed to have cardinality ď κ, the following ques-
tion naturally arises:
Question 2 : Can Robinson’s infinite forcing give a consis-
tency proof of the corresponding BFApΓκq?
2. Concluding remarks
In this paper we showed an interesting connection between generic abso-
luteness and Robinson infinite forcing. One could think that the reason is
the close connection between Cohen’s and Robinson’s techniques. However,
the possibility to recast Robinson’s infinite forcing by means of model the-
oretic constructions that do not involve forcing suggests otherwise. Indeed,
Cherlin showed [4] that infinitely generic structures can be approximated
by chains of models6 that inductively capture larger and larger classes of
persistent sentences, without introducing any notion coming form the the-
ory of forcing.
If Cohen’s and Robinson’s techniques are fairly different from a theoret-
ical perspective, however the results of this paper suggest that the strat-
egy for overcoming independence in set theory—i.e. generic absoluteness
results—can be seen as a particular case of a model theoretic technique
applied to the multiverse. In a slogan, Robinson’s ideas offer a revenge
against Cohen’s independence results.
Therefore, the extent and the nature of the link between generic abso-
luteness and infinite forcing remains a promising question that still requires
6See [11] for other approximationmethods by E. Fisher, H. Simmons, or J. Hirschfield.
We decided to mention only Cherlin, since the notion of persistent formulas bears an
obvious connection with generic absoluteness.
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a complete answer. We started here by scratching the surface of an inter-
esting interplay between set theory and model theory.
The obvious extension of the results of this paper concerns the possibility
to overcome the limits imposed by the height of the models of a generic
multiverse—which, by Cohen’s method, is always the same of the ground
model. Indeed, we might modify the definition of MΓ
M
so that at each
step the hight of the models increases. An obvious attempt could use
generic ultrapowers; in that case it would be interesting to understand the
connection between this kind of multiverse and Woodin’s Pmax. We leave
this task for future work.
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